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Abstract: Contemporary critics of the administrative state are right to highlight the dangers of 
vesting too much power in a centralized bureaucracy removed from popular oversight and 
accountability. Too often neglected in this literature, however, are the dangers of vesting too 
little power in a centralized state, which enables dominant groups to further expand their social 
and economic advantages through decentralized means. This article seeks to synthesize these 
concerns, understanding them as reflecting the same underlying danger of state capture. It then 
articulates a set of heuristics for the design of public and administrative institutions, which aim 
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heuristics, it claims, we can successfully employ the administrative state as a weapon against 
concentrated private power, rather than allowing it to serve as a tool of dominant groups. 
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§I. Introduction 
The state’s relationship to concentrated private power presents one of the most vexing 
dilemmas of modern politics. On the one hand, states are uniquely positioned to contest deeply 
entrenched social, political, and economic hierarchies. On the other hand, state policy written 
by and for dominant groups is one of the key mechanisms through which their dominance has 
long been maintained. How, then, can the state be transformed from a tool of concentrated 
private power into a weapon against it? The first aim of this article is to show that this question 
cannot be ignored. The second is to outline a framework for answering it. 
It is crucial to begin with this dilemma of public and private power, because opponents of 
the administrative state—including some represented in this volume—are apt to ignore it. Such 
critics are surely right to highlight the dangers of vesting too much power in a centralized 
bureaucracy removed from popular oversight and accountability. All too often, however, they 
neglect the dangers of vesting too little power in a centralized state. As I argue in §II-III, states 
are already so deeply embedded within the fabric of modern society that any attempts to retreat 
into the background will only exacerbate the problem, enabling dominant groups and powerful 
interests to further expand their social and economic advantages through decentralized means. 
States have often played a major role in creating and entrenching these advantages, of course, 
but they cannot simply withdraw at this stage, hoping to wash their hands of the problem. Their 
only choice is to develop new forms of action that challenge this concentrated private power.  
The framework presented in §IV-VI answers this call. After showing how the threats posed 
by both public and private power can be understood to reflect the same underlying danger of 
state capture, I argue that orienting ourselves towards the goal of minimizing capture can help 
us answer three crucial questions. First, what general approach should states take to private 
power in each policy area? Second, which substantive policy tools are least susceptible to 
capture? And third, what procedural reforms can further insulate states from capture?  
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In responding to these questions, my primary aim is neither to defend a set of abstract 
normative foundations, nor to propose a concrete policy platform, but rather to provide a set of 
mid-range heuristics for the design of public and administrative institutions. These heuristics 
are meant to be compatible with many different foundational assumptions, and they are 
indeterminate between a similarly broad range of potential policy implications. Though I use 
certain policies as illustrations, that is, I do not defend any of them in comprehensive terms, 
and I do not claim that minimizing capture must be our only goal. Nevertheless, the framework 
that emerges yields powerful insights about the proper scope and optimal forms of state action, 
which may be useful to political actors with a variety of substantive convictions. 
In turn, this framework demonstrates why opponents of the administrative state are wrong 
to suppose that abandoning its projects is the only solution to its pathologies. In fact, I argue, 
that is no solution at all. Assuming that there will be public power of some kind, one of its 
major imperatives must be to prevent itself from being captured by private interests—and that 
requires an active and capable administrative state. On the basis of broadly shared concerns 
about capture, in other words, I show that it is both necessary and possible to transform the 
state into a reliable weapon against concentrated private power. Grappling with the dilemma 
of public and private power may be difficult, but it is not impossible, and this article highlights 
some promising paths forward. 
§II. What is concentrated private power, and why is it a problem? 
My first task is to explain why the state ought to be engaged in fighting concentrated private 
power in the first place, and I begin by defining the central concepts at work. Power, on my 
account, includes any of the conditions enabling agents to achieve their ends.1 Not all forms of 
power must be possessed and used intentionally,2 but those which are—such as wealth, social 
and cultural capital, institutional position, persuasive capacity, and so on—may be called power 
resources.3 When held by actors outside of state institutions, these resources count as private, 
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and any non-state agent or group with great power relative to its peers can thus be said to 
possess concentrated private power. Most obviously, these private actors include individual 
agents as well as organizations with the ability to act like agents, such as corporations or unions. 
In addition, however, my account also assigns concentrated private power to any group, class, 
or category of people whose members share common interests and possess asymmetrical power 
relative to members of other groups—even if they lack institutionalized collective agency. For 
instance, a racial or ethnic group can be said to have concentrated private power simply because 
its members possess more power resources, on average, than members of other groups. 
Inevitably, there will be gray areas in classifying certain forms of power as public or 
private: what is the status, for instance, of state services that have been contracted out to private 
firms? This blurring of public and private realms is increasingly prevalent, and many regard it 
with suspicion4—indeed, part of the reason I have developed the concept of state capture is to 
help us grapple with such entanglements. Yet the existence of some overlap does not preclude 
all distinctions. Many forms of power are clearly public, including most legislative, judicial, 
administrative, and military institutions. Many others, meanwhile—such as the wealth of 
individuals, corporations, and interest groups—are not.  
Defined as such, concentrated private power is not necessarily bad; in fact, some forms are 
indispensable to balance the concentrated public power of the state.5 Yet concentrated private 
power can also be used to capture that public power, and this is, by definition, troubling. State 
capture occurs, on my account, whenever public power is made to serve the interests of some 
partial faction or private actor, at the expense of the public. All else equal, therefore, any 
instance of state capture is worthy of censure and resistance.6 Yet capture can never be entirely 
prevented—indeed, we should expect it to be widespread in any realistic society—and the level 
of concern merited by any particular instance of capture will vary widely, depending on its 
severity. Capture can extend throughout many different arms of the state, for instance, or it 
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may be confined to specific institutions. The public interest can be seriously undermined, or 
only mildly threatened. It is often initiated and maintained intentionally by some of those whose 
interests it serves, but this is not a requirement of the concept.  
At the extreme end, examples of state capture include tyranny and apartheid, whereby 
nearly everything about the state is fundamentally organized around serving the interests of 
some at the expense of others. Yet the concept also covers more mundane cases of corruption 
and regulatory capture, in which a specific office or agency is turned away from its public 
purpose and made to serve a private or factional interest.7 Though perhaps somewhat jarring, 
the extraordinary breadth of this concept has advantages, allowing us to see the commonalities 
in form among otherwise disparate phenomena.8  
The concept of interest plays a key normative role here, and in particular, the idea of the 
public interest will inevitably serve as the focal point for much contestation about the existence 
and relative severity of capture. Whether something counts as capture—and, if so, how 
problematic it is—will depend on whether, and to what extent, the public interest has been 
violated. In this article, however, I refrain from saying much more about what the public 
interest actually is, because the broader theoretical framework I develop here is meant to be 
compatible with many different views on this question. Some might define the public interest 
in terms of a consequentialist conception of the common good, for instance, and others in terms 
of a deontological conception of justice, but both groups should have ample reason to oppose 
tyranny, apartheid, corruption, and so on. I hope to be persuasive to these and many other 
groups—each of whom can fill in their own, more specific views about the public interest—by 
leaving the normative foundations of my arguments deliberately underspecified. 
Because we can identify particular instances of capture without settling upon a general 
definition of the public interest, meanwhile, this studied imprecision does not endanger the 
practical usefulness of my framework. As individuals seeking normative guidance, that is, we 
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can be confident in identifying clear violations of the public interest, even if we remain hesitant 
to specify exactly what the public interest is in any detail. And as citizens deliberating with one 
another, similarly, we can agree on many concrete instances of capture without sharing an 
abstract conception of the public interest. Where imprecision or disagreement remains, 
finally—concerning the relative severity of different cases, perhaps—this may simply reflect 
the real uncertainty we face in the political world. Rather than claiming a level of certainty we 
cannot possibly possess, continuing to reflect and disagree along these lines is a valuable yet 
humbling exercise. It reminds us of the limits of our political knowledge while enabling us to 
expand, ever-so-slowly, our base of cumulative insight.9 
We are now better equipped to answer the question at hand: why must the state fight 
concentrated private power? In the most general terms, the reason is that it presents a constant 
threat of capture.10 Any partial faction or private interest could conceivably use state power to 
advance its ends at the expense of the public, but those with the most concentrated power 
clearly pose the largest threat. This is not just intuitive speculation: it has also been the normal 
state of affairs throughout recorded human history.11 Liberal rights, democratic procedures, and 
constitutional constraints all help to contain and resist capture, but every system has a breaking 
point, and in the absence of any restraints on the accumulation of private power, it is only a 
matter of time before of some individual, organization, partial faction, or elite coalition 
becomes powerful enough to breach it, enabling them to use the state to pursue their interests 
at will. To protect against capture and abuse, therefore, we cannot simply limit the state’s 
power, defensively, but must also go on the offensive, taking proactive measures against the 
accumulation of private power—even though doing so inevitably carries risks of its own.12 
At the same time, of course, it would be absurd to seek the elimination of all concentrated 
private power: at the very least, I have emphasized, a flourishing ecology of diverse private 
organizations is necessary to check the abuse of state power. Thus, resisting state capture 
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requires striking the right balance between public and private power, rather than subordinating 
one to the other. If the state is overwhelmingly powerful relative to all non-state organizations 
and private interests, it will be impossible to coordinate resistance to abuse and capture when 
it occurs. Yet as certain private interests and partial factions become more powerful relative to 
the state, public institutions become more vulnerable to having their public purposes hijacked. 
In the rest of this article, I adopt just such a balancing-act approach to the dilemma of public 
and private power. Before we proceed, however, it will be instructive to consider a salient 
alternative to that approach, which has proved tempting to a broad spectrum of democrats, 
socialists, and other radicals. This is to eliminate or at least mitigate the threat of concentrated 
private power by centralizing the functions performed by potentially dangerous non-state actors 
and subjecting them to the collective control of the people. Rather than fighting concentrated 
private power, in other words, the idea is to make private power public. 
§III. Why not make private power public? 
Perhaps the most prominent and far-reaching version of this suggestion belongs to a certain 
brand of socialism.13 On the classic Marxist account, political power is largely epiphenomenal 
on material conditions. As long as citizens are barred from changing fundamental features of 
capitalist power relations, therefore—especially the private ownership of productive 
resources—democratic control of state policy can be little more than window-dressing. Even 
if it is exercised by elected leaders, that is, state power can never be legitimate unless the means 
of production are also subjected to collective decision-making procedures. 
There is certainly something compelling about this idea, which follows a common account 
of political democracy to its logical conclusion. After all, nearly everyone agrees that in 
responding to the dangers of concentrated coercive power, it is clearly better to create a state 
with a monopoly on violence, and subject it to democratic oversight, rather than allowing 
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warlords and private militias to compete over territory. Given this logic, many wonder why the 
same should not be true of economic and social power. 
Traditional liberal replies to this suggestion have relied on an understanding of coercion as 
representing a categorically different kind of threat to individual autonomy than other forms of 
power.14 In my view, however, decades of critique on a variety of fronts have rendered this 
response untenable.15 The real problem with the idea of centralizing all economic and social 
power lies not with its refusal to make a principled distinction between coercion and other 
forms of power, but with its reliance on collective control to legitimize concentrated power. 
 In short, the concept of collective control is simply too slippery to be trusted with such a 
crucial task.16 Consider, for one, that most people know very little about politics, and that even 
those with substantial knowledge reliably make decisions that affirm their group identities 
rather than an impartial reflective process.17 We might imagine that under better circumstances, 
people could be relatively better informed and more civically minded, but no one—not even 
legislators themselves—can gain enough knowledge to make fully informed decisions about 
every political question, or entirely eliminate the possibility of motivated reasoning. Even if 
we assumed perfectly rational, impartial, and informed participants, finally, the possibility of 
majority cycles within a vast multidimensional issue space would still prevent the formation of 
a coherent popular will or truly collective decision.18 As a result, what passes for collective 
decision-making in the real world is in fact pervasively structured by unequal power relations, 
as those with concentrated private power use their outsized resources to shape the political 
agenda—as well as media narratives and partisan attachments—to their advantage.19  
Many democratic theorists understand this problem perfectly well as it applies to elections. 
They recognize, in other words, that electing top-level political leaders is not sufficient for 
achieving truly collective control over centralized state power. As a result, most leave certain 
areas to individual discretion: even Marx recognized the wisdom of protecting personal 
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property. Yet most democratic theorists also retain the ambition of bringing certain areas of 
common life under collective control, by moving beyond a minimalist conception of what is 
required by that ideal—calling for greater participation and deliberation, for instance, or a more 
thoroughgoing equality of opportunity for influence.20 
To put it plainly, I am not convinced. As I have argued elsewhere, these variations on the 
ideal of collective control suffer many of the same flaws as commonsense views grounded in 
elections, while introducing new problems of their own.21 Yet further contesting these points 
is beyond my scope here. Instead, my aim is simply to provide a different way of determining 
which decisions ought to be centralized. Assuming that we cannot fully legitimize centralized 
political power by subjecting it to truly collective control, I frame the question in pragmatic 
and comparative terms, seeking to evaluate the dangers presented by concrete cases of 
centralization in relation to the dangers presented by concrete decentralized alternatives. And 
this perspective clarifies why our reasons for centralizing coercive power and subjecting it to 
collective control cannot be extended to the idea of socializing economic and social power.22 
At base, electoral democracy is an equilibrium in which no faction has a secure grip on 
power, such that all incumbents have strong incentives not to use coercive state power in 
brazenly partisan ways.23 As a result, centralizing coercive power and subjecting it to the 
oversight of elected civilian leaders is far safer than allowing private actors to wield it 
independently. What electoral democracy cannot do, by contrast, is enable genuine collective 
self-rule.24 As a result, our justification for centralizing coercive power and subjecting it to the 
collective control provided by electoral institutions cannot be extended to all forms of private 
power. Collective decision-making procedures cannot eliminate the danger of socializing 
ownership and control of all productive resources, media outlets, religious organizations, and 
academic institutions. Such measures would give leaders great discretionary power while 
leaving opponents with very few bases of power from which to contest incumbent action, 
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thereby reducing the costs of incumbent abuse and threatening the fragile democratic 
equilibrium itself.  
Nevertheless, if the state relinquishes all control over economic and social power resources, 
private actors are likely to accumulate them in dangerous amounts. After all, that is what gives 
rise to the dilemma of public and private power at the heart of this article. In some policy areas, 
therefore, the safest option may be to facilitate decentralized competition with minimal state 
involvement, while in others, more active involvement will actually be safer. Determining 
which general approach to state involvement is appropriate in various circumstances is thus an 
important first step in employing the framework of resisting or minimizing state capture. 
§IV. Which general approach to state involvement is safest in each policy area? 
It is important to recall here that minimizing state capture is not the only goal we ought to 
pursue, and that state action might be justified for many different reasons. Purely on the 
grounds of economic efficiency, for instance, many people believe that a centralized state 
should provide certain public goods and regulate natural monopolies. Similarly, state-run 
public transportation systems may generate valuable environmental benefits, and universal 
provision of certain basic services may be desirable on grounds of justice. These are all 
potentially valid reasons for pursuing state action, which would have to be considered in any 
comprehensive practical judgment about the wisdom of these policies. Yet all raise questions 
about what counts as the public interest, and as noted, my arguments here aim to be compatible 
with many different accounts of what that is. I shall therefore set them aside, in order to focus 
more carefully on the particular questions raised by the dilemma of public and private power. 
The sort of concerns I wish to consider here are internal to the demand to resist state 
capture, and they can push in either direction. State centralization can be quite dangerous in 
certain policy areas, and concerns about capture therefore lean towards decentralization in 
those areas. Yet as we saw in the case of coercive power, decentralized private ownership and 
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control can also be quite dangerous, and when these dangers outweigh the danger of 
centralization, concerns about capture will suggest centralization instead. In practice, 
moreover, the options are not limited to “centralization” or “decentralization”; nor even to a 
continuous spectrum between the two. For instance, there are also dimensions of polycentricity 
and subsidiarity, while vast institutional diversity is possible within each dimension.25 
Setting aside such complexities for now, however, we may begin our discussion with two 
basic elements—a singular state and a pluralistic private sphere—which are typically related 
in one of four ways. First, there may be “public provision” by the state, such that private 
providers are rare or nonexistent—as with fire insurance, for instance. The second model may 
be called “public participation,” by which the state owns or controls one competitor in an 
otherwise decentralized market. Public education and postal services were often introduced to 
guarantee universal provision, for example, but private competitors are permitted in most 
places. Public radio and television broadcasters, meanwhile, typically aim to ensure that a 
certain type of content is provided, rather than universal access to these services. 
The third model may be called “substantive regulation,” meaning that rather than 
participating in decentralized competition itself, the state seeks to shape the outcomes of the 
competition by making rules about how it must proceed. This is how crucial social functions 
like housing and finance are managed in most modern states, though in some cases the state 
may be a limited participant here as well—as with public housing projects or postal banking 
services. Indeed, the borders between these models can become quite fuzzy at times.  
The fuzziest boundary of all, however, is that between substantive regulation and the fourth 
model, “formal regulation,” which describes less active state involvement in a decentralized 
sphere. Some might be tempted to call this a “laissez-faire” or “free market” model, but these 
labels are seriously misleading in this context. No matter how “private” or “unregulated” it 
seems, every sphere of life in modern societies is pervasively structured by the state’s 
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background enforcement of private and criminal law. Terms like “laissez-faire,” “free market,” 
and “unregulated” occlude this reality, giving the impression of a stark binary between areas 
of social life where the government “intervenes,” and areas where private actors choose 
“freely.” By contrast, the distinction between formal and substantive regulation enables us to 
discuss real variation in the state’s general stance towards private actors across different 
areas—i.e., how specific its policies are, how frequently they change, how intentionally they 
seek particular outcomes—without falsely implying that proactive forms of involvement are 
necessarily more consequential for the distribution of power than the enforcement of “basic” 
legal structures that everyone simply takes for granted. 
Even when they are written in general terms, stable over time, and not clearly intended to 
achieve particular outcomes, for instance, small differences in rules governing contracts and 
torts can still have enormous distributive implications.26 Indeed, the very existence of a system 
of private law has immense distributive implications as well, and cannot simply be assumed as 
a neutral background.27 The question we must ask, then, is not whether or how much a state 
ought to intervene within a pre-existing private sphere, but rather how it ought to structure 
private interactions. More specifically, the choice between public provision, public 
participation, substantive regulation, and formal regulation turns out not to be like choosing a 
point on a quantitative scale of state involvement, such that more involvement always brings 
greater risks of capture. Instead, the safest option in any case depends on particular features of 
the policy area or set of social functions under consideration. 
Take the question of health care provision. Given its great complexity and central social 
importance, no reasonably advanced modern state engages only in basic formal regulation of 
actors in the health care industry. Most employ fully public provision, while the others rely on 
public participation and/or very significant substantive regulation. If we assume that 
minimizing state involvement will always reduce the overall risks of capture, then, we would 
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expect some form of substantive regulation to be the safest available model. Yet a comparison 
between European-style public provision and the model of substantive regulation employed by 
the United States gives us reason to doubt this supposition, for the latter gives powerful private 
actors far more substantial opportunities to ensure that state policy serves their interests.  
To begin with, the very idea of structuring the health care system around private insurance 
corporations was originally devised and implemented at the behest of the American Medical 
Association, over widespread protests that it would predictably serve the interests of doctors 
above everyone else.28 The most significant revision of that system, meanwhile—the 2010 
Affordable Care Act—was written in close consultation with insurers and other industry giants, 
whose profits have soared in the years since it was passed.29 This model of substantive 
regulation within an otherwise decentralized market is almost certainly the major reason that 
health care costs are so much higher in the US than in other comparable countries.30 
Of course, systems of socialized medicine are also subject to all sorts of pathologies, and it 
is not my purpose here to defend any particular way of organizing a national health care system. 
The point is simply that a centralized system with more active and obvious state involvement 
is not, by definition, more prone to capture than a decentralized system with a state that 
apparently stands back from the fray, serving merely to police the competition of private actors. 
Indeed, the unmistakably proactive nature of the state’s involvement in a system of public 
provision makes its activities salient in ways that may help to insure it against capture.  
If everyone uses public transit, public education, or public health care services on a regular 
basis, the quality of service provision will be very salient for everyone, and the state actors 
responsible for this provision will have relatively little room to extract rents. If the role of the 
state in structuring a private market is hidden behind an impenetrable thicket of regulations and 
licensing rules, by contrast, the state’s responsibility for poor provision and other undesirable 
outcomes delivered by private actors will be far more opaque.31 This lack of clear 
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accountability channels is a major enabling factor for capture.32 In fact, Jon D. Michaels claims, 
this is precisely what has happened in recent waves of privatization, which have given certain 
private interests exclusive access to the material, cultural, and legal support of the state, while 
weakening democratic oversight of the broadly public functions they continue to serve.33 
One final dynamic worth noting is that systems of universal provision make it more difficult 
to use health care as a bargaining chip or particularistic reward for certain factions, which can 
help to entrench particular individuals or parties in power. Far beyond the particular context of 
health care, in fact, universality can often be a powerful weapon against capture, eliminating 
the discretionary power that state agents would otherwise use to extract rents and perpetuate 
their own factional interests.34 This is another reason to expect that public provision may be 
less prone to capture than regulation of decentralized markets. 
Again, this is not the place to stake out a clear position on health care or any other deeply 
complex policy question. All four models of public involvement in the private sphere have 
advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of resisting state capture, and these 
concerns must then be weighed against others we might have—about efficiency, fairness, and 
so on—which are external to this framework altogether. In many policy areas, regulation of 
some kind will be the safest approach, as well as the best overall. The point of lingering on the 
health care example, rather, is to show that we cannot assume that less active, salient, and 
intentional forms of state involvement are always less prone to capture. Instead, we have to 
evaluate which approach is safest—public provision, public participation, substantive 
regulation, or formal regulation—on a case-by-case basis.  
This case-by-case evaluation will focus on the policy area itself, of course, but it may also 
involve more contingent features of the context. As long as significant independent sources of 
power remain, for instance, some degree of state ownership may be acceptable, but the more 
the balance of power between state and non-state actors shifts, the more dangerous it will be to 
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put additional resources in state hands. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of accountability through 
elections and civil society will affect the relative safety of centralization projects, such that 
wealthier, more educated, more engaged, and less polarized societies will likely be able to 
accommodate greater levels of state ownership or management, while those divided along 
regional, ethnic, racial, or religious lines may face unique risks with particular policies. 
As this discussion suggests, then, the contribution of the framework articulated here—
which aims at minimizing the overall risk of state capture—is not only to help us decide which 
general model of public-private interaction is safest in a given policy area. In particular, it helps 
us answer two further questions, in each case generating generalizable strategies for the design 
of public and administrative institutions. The first concerns the form substantive policy should 
take. Given that regulation of the private sphere is required, for instance, many choices remain 
about how to implement that regulation, and a focus on state capture suggests several heuristics 
for making those choices. Meanwhile, the second question concerns the procedural tools that 
might be able to further insulate state action from capture. I address each in turn. 
§V. Which substantive policy tools are least susceptible to capture? 
The framework of resisting state capture is grounded in a constant awareness of the threats 
of capture that are posed by those with concentrated private power. In considering the design 
of substantive policy, therefore, it aims to minimize three key risk factors for this outcome: the 
amount of discretion allotted to state actors, the number of levers for influencing policy that 
are open to private actors, and the independent capacity of private actors to perpetrate capture. 
In turn, this mandate generates several design principles for capture-resistant policy, notably 
including transparency, simplicity, and adversarialism. As usual, however, there are no silver 
bullets, and these design principles will apply differently across different circumstances. 
Each of these design principles can be observed in the idea of “structuralist” regulation 
developed by K. Sabeel Rahman.35 According to Rahman, early Progressive-era thinkers like 
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Louis Brandeis and John Dewey sought to democratize the nascent administrative state, so that 
it could curb the concentrated power of big business without succumbing to the forms of 
capture that its laissez-faire critics rightly identified. Yet these democratic approaches to 
administration were eventually superseded by expert-driven or “managerialist” models of 
regulation during the New Deal era—which then set the tone for the subsequent development 
of the American administrative state.36 Managerialists did not ignore capture entirely, Rahman 
acknowledges, but their primary concern was to insulate bureaucrats from political conflict, on 
the supposition that expert administrators would better realize long-term common interests if 
not forced to cater to the short-term interests of politicians. And while that may be true, he 
points out, insulation from all political influence also opens these expert bodies to other forms 
of capture.37 On Rahman’s telling, the result of New Dealers’ managerialist confidence was a 
regulatory state that did manifest a number of pathologies, and when world events tested public 
confidence in experts during the 1970s, the neglected Progressive alternative was overlooked 
in the course of a sharp turn back to the laissez-faire pole with the onset of neoliberalism.38 
Rejecting this binary between capture-prone “managerialism” and an uncompromising 
laissez-faire alternative, Rahman posits the early Progressives’ ideas as a third way.39 Instead 
of abandoning the project of regulation altogether, more specifically, he argues that we should 
follow Brandeis and others in elaborating “structuralist” approaches to regulation that are more 
resistant to capture.40 And though his book primarily addresses financial regulation, the lessons 
of his broader narrative can be applied to many areas where substantive regulation is the 
appropriate model of state involvement. 
For managerialists, on Rahman’s account, the goal is to fine-tune market dynamics, and 
this process thus places significant trust in experts to get the details exactly right. Aside from 
the risk that experts might make poor decisions for entirely innocent reasons, this level of 
discretion also creates a serious threat of capture—and far from resolving this threat, insulation 
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from all political scrutiny tends to exacerbate it. A managerialist approach to certain regulatory 
tasks requires extremely detailed knowledge that must often be provided by regulated firms 
themselves, creating what Wendy Wagner calls “information capture.”41 More generally, the 
close working relationship that is required for this style of managerialist regulation—as well 
as the broader social background and cultural affinities that regulators share with those they 
regulate—can result in what James Kwak calls “cultural capture.”42 
On the alternative approach Rahman proposes, regulation would focus less on fine-tuning 
market outcomes and more on formulating “bright-line” rules and broader changes to the 
underlying structure of financial markets.43 On the one hand, this “structuralist” model exhibits 
greater humility about the capacities of regulators to do the fine-tuning work. On the other 
hand, it also exhibits more skepticism about the tendency of “free” markets to produce optimal 
results. It accepts the broader social value of finance—i.e., allocating resources more efficiently 
than feasible alternatives—but because of the high systemic risks of innovation in such a 
crucial field, it puts the burden of proof on financiers to show that novel products are worth 
whatever dangers might accompany them, rather than on regulators to show that they are too 
dangerous to allow. In other words, a simple and transparent mandate serves to minimize the 
number of opportunities available to industry actors for influencing the proceedings. 
Crucially, it also enables regulators to take an adversarial stance towards those they seek 
to regulate. Where managerialist regulation aiming to exercise fine-grained control requires 
close collaboration between state and industry actors, a structural approach guards the public 
nature of state power more jealously. Indeed, hypervigilance towards industry actors is 
embedded within the substantive mandate for structural regulation, which seeks not only to 
make defensive regulatory policy that is relatively capture-resistant, but also to go on the 
offensive by reducing the independent capacity for capture possessed by industry actors.  
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In other words, at least part of the job of regulators is to undermine the structures making 
capture of future regulators more likely. Capture is more likely where industries have united 
interests, for instance, or when particular companies wield immense power on their own, and 
less likely when there are diverse interests vying for a regulator’s attention.44 Thus, structuralist 
regulation should try to prevent these concentrations of private power from existing in the first 
place. As examples, Rahman mentions the separation of commercial and investment banking, 
limits on bank size, and aggressive antitrust enforcement—all of which have clear potential 
benefits from the perspective of minimizing capture.45 Of course, these proposals may also 
have drawbacks not considered here: again, my aim is not to offer a comprehensive defense of 
any particular policy, but simply to illustrate the sort of tools that state actors might use if they 
are seeking to enable administrative action while minimizing the danger of capture.  
Generalizing from Rahman’s approach, then, we can note its strong resonances with the 
more general Progressive spirit of antimonopoly—perhaps most memorably encapsulated in 
an essay by Brandeis called “The Curse of Bigness.”46 In this spirit, we might replace a 
backward-looking, criminal model of regulation, whereby only violations of pre-existing rules 
can trigger regulatory discipline, with a forward-looking, prophylactic model. The idea is that 
by the time serious harm has been done, it is often too late, because the wrongdoers will have 
already captured or co-opted those who could have punished them. Instead, we must understand 
bigness itself as a threat, because it provides the kind of market power and organizational 
capacity that enables anti-competitive behavior and the capture of state institutions. More 
urgent in the long run than punishing particular cases of wrongdoing, on this model, is 
preventing the conditions that would enable future wrongdoing to go unpunished. Competition 
is a crucial tool for resisting capture, in other words, but protecting it often requires active state 
involvement. Once again, the dilemma of public and private power cannot be ignored. 
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§VI. How can state action be procedurally insulated from capture? 
The motivating question of this article, in brief, concerns how the state can safely fight the 
dangers posed by concentrated private power, given that empowering it to do so inevitably 
carries dangers of its own. So far, I have focused largely on substantive policy—considering 
the general approach the state should take to the private sphere across various policy areas, as 
well as the kind of tools it should give to regulators and bureaucrats, if we want them to be 
resistant to capture. No matter which substantive policies we pursue, however, it is also crucial 
to consider how they are implemented. Any power that is given to state actors inevitably carries 
certain dangers, and in order to reduce that danger as much as possible, we must also develop 
a suite of procedural strategies to keep them tethered to the public interest.  
The basic framework of liberal democracy, anchored by competitive elections, is the most 
obvious example of such a procedural strategy. Unfortunately, it is also far from sufficient: 
diverse forms of capture plague even the most “advanced” liberal democracies. Indeed, it seems 
like the administrative state poses special problems in this regard: as the other papers in this 
volume demonstrate, independence, legislative oversight, and executive control all open the 
door to various forms of capture. In this section, therefore, I explore how institutionalizing 
oppositional expertise and direct popular oversight within administrative agencies can 
democratize the administrative state from within, providing additional layers of protection 
against capture and thus helping us resolve the dilemma of public and private power. 
Institutionalized oppositional expertise 
As I have suggested throughout, adversarial competition can often serve to weaken the grip 
of concentrated private power, but whether it does so depends entirely on the way this 
competition is structured. In regulatory contexts, for instance, practices of lobbying predictably 
favor those with the strongest incentives to influence policy, the greatest capacity to coordinate, 
and the largest stockpile of resources. Unsurprisingly, the results are often contrary to the 
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public interest. Yet the proper solution is not to eliminate lobbying, as many are tempted to 
suggest: even if this quixotic feat could be accomplished, the activity of lobbying serves too 
many important informational purposes in a complex and pluralistic society to be abandoned 
entirely. On the other side of the spectrum, a similar problem afflicts the proposal of George 
Stigler and other public choice theorists, who insist that the only possible solution to regulatory 
capture is to eliminate regulation itself.47 As we should recognize by now, this extreme posture 
does not represent a serious attempt to grapple with the dilemma of public and private power. 
Rather than forsaking lobbying as inherently unfair, or regulation as invariably corrupt, I 
argue that administrative procedures can best be protected from capture if we transparently 
embrace their adversarial nature, while leveling the playing field among groups with a clear 
interest in the outcome. The idea is to make rulemaking fairer not by stifling or concealing 
competition between groups who seek only to protect their interests, but by equalizing the terms 
on which that competition will inevitably take place—i.e., by supporting disadvantaged groups 
and institutionalizing opposition at every stage.  
As counterintuitive as it may sound to abandon neutrality in this way—putting our fingers 
on the scale to support competitors with the fewest resources—this sort of proposal should not 
be wholly unfamiliar. It is widely recognized that stable democratic institutions depend on 
strong, well-organized opposition parties, and we have already discussed how antitrust and 
other forms of antimonopoly can contribute to healthier economic competition. The idea of 
institutionalizing oppositional expertise simply extends the same logic to the administrative 
state. Of course, the question of which interest groups require remedial support will always be 
somewhat contentious. Yet in the administrative state, regulated industries combine strong 
incentives to manipulate policy with concentrated organizational capacity, so it is not difficult 
to see why their opponents would need additional support as a corrective. 
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Scholars of regulatory capture have generated a variety of proposals that fit this general 
model. One is to place “contrarians” of various stripes within regulatory agencies themselves.48 
Another is to invite challenges from third parties, and reimburse their costs when their 
challenges are successful.49 Still another is to give oversight to courts,50 or to super-regulatory 
watchdog agencies.51 Yet the details of the proposals are not particularly important to my 
broader argument. The key point is that regulators must defend their decisions as consistent 
with the public interest, against adversaries with an institutional mandate to highlight where 
those decisions may actually serve the private or factional interests of a corporation, industry, 
or other lobby group. Because of their embrace of an adversarial approach, such strategies do 
have significant potential to disrupt cycles of capture within regulatory agencies. Yet over time, 
those with concentrated private power will predictably figure out how to manipulate the new 
rules to their advantage, and those rules may gradually lose their ability to prevent capture.  
In my view, therefore, institutionalizing opposition will work best when supplemented by 
avenues for direct participation by ordinary people. To be sure: widespread citizen participation 
is no panacea, and as I argued in §III, there is no simple connection between popular 
participation and collective control over legitimate outcomes.52 Indeed, it is not without reason 
that managerialists see insulation from political pressure as an important tool for resisting 
capture. Yet popular participation takes many forms, and it is perfectly consistent to insulate 
bureaucrats from the corrupting influences of legislative horse-trading and hyper-partisan mass 
politics while creating more promising levers for popular influence. 
Randomly selected citizen oversight juries 
One such mechanism involves random selection for office—an ancient practice known as 
“sortition” that is rapidly winning converts among theorists and reformers alike.53 So far, 
however, this contemporary discussion is largely dominated by a single use case: deliberative 
mini-publics composed of randomly selected citizens.54 More generally, it assumes that 
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lotteries are primarily valuable as an alternative to representative elections, serving to more 
accurately or authentically interpret the popular will.55 In my view, this narrow focus obscures 
the full potential of sortition, directing reformist energy away from more fruitful goals. Though 
many of its advocates tend to understand sortition as an extension of deliberative democracy, 
thereby rejuvenating representation or renewing popular sovereignty, the most astute analysts 
have understood that its distinctive potential lies in its capacity to prevent the capture of public 
institutions.56 Rather than trying to replace existing legislative institutions with bodies of 
randomly selected citizens, I have argued elsewhere, the most promising use for sortition lies 
in “citizen oversight juries” within the administrative state.57 
This entails giving randomly selected citizens real power—unlike many existing 
experiments with deliberative mini-publics, whose “advisory” recommendations have often 
been ignored by real legislatures.58 Yet it would also avoid many of the serious objections to 
more radical “lottocratic” proposals which would give direct legislative power to randomly 
selected bodies. For one, the idea of replacing representative bodies faces extraordinary 
practical hurdles in most countries, and even if such obstacles could be overcome, the resulting 
system would likely face serious legitimacy issues. Perhaps most concerning, it would still 
depend heavily on agenda-setting procedures that are hidden from view, and thus would hardly 
be immune to the kinds of capture plaguing representative institutions. Understanding sortition 
as one among many methods for preventing capture and corruption, by contrast, suggests a role 
for ordinary democratic citizens that is realistic yet crucial. Without denying the importance of 
political elites in policy formation, it casts ordinary people as guardians of the public interest. 
Why might this help to prevent capture? On the one hand, sortition introduces an element 
of randomness into political procedures that frustrates the attempts of powerful private actors 
to corrupt the public nature of those procedures. Popular election and meritocratic appointment 
have distinct advantages as methods of distributing political office, but they are also inevitably 
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subject to various forms of manipulation and influence. As such, they are predictably biased 
towards the interests of those with concentrated power. By inserting a “blind break” which 
interrupts these channels of influence, a truly random process thus levels the playing field. 
On the other hand, those randomly selected for oversight roles will be ordinary, coming 
from outside the established halls of power. Given that wise political judgment often requires 
significant expertise and experience, of course, this requirement has obvious drawbacks. 
Indeed, that is one reason not to follow sortition’s more radical proponents in demanding the 
complete replacement of elections with lotteries. At the same time, political naïveté has distinct 
advantages as well. It is precisely because most participants would begin the process with low 
political knowledge and few ideological commitments that their deliberations could provide a 
distinctive check on career politicians and other official experts, whose judgments are 
intimately tied up with ideology and other identity commitments. 
On the specific model I propose, moreover, ordinary citizens would be tasked not with 
general-purpose legislation but with oversight on specific issues. They would not be expected 
to generate an entire agenda, but simply to make yes-or-no judgments about particular cases. 
Oversight juries might be convened on an ad hoc basis in response to administrative decisions 
of a certain type or significance level—such as redistricting decisions, for instance, or merger 
approvals and defense contracts worth more than a billion dollars. Meanwhile, longer-standing 
councils could meet for several months to conduct a more general review of an administrative 
agency, or scrutinize interactions between legislators and lobbyists.  
In each case, crucially, the process would be structured to include institutionalized 
opposition, so that the agency would be forced to defend its decisions as serving the public 
interest, while various adversaries would attempt to convince the jury otherwise. The jury 
would then decide to approve the policy, reject it, or send it for further review elsewhere—
though in theory, juries would not need to reject policies very often, because the threat of 
~ 24 ~ 
exposure posed by this process would disincentivize capture from occurring in the first place. 
Meanwhile, it would not require specialized knowledge beyond what the agency and its 
opponents could provide. As with the ordinary citizens in trial juries, therefore, members of 
oversight juries could be sufficiently trained through this adversarial process itself. This would 
give supposedly neutral facilitators and experts far less power to set the agenda or otherwise 
influence the proceedings, thus making juries far less susceptible to capture.  
Nevertheless, a system of citizen oversight juries would still depend on the existence of 
organized groups to raise challenges, and countervailing experts to make arguments against 
agency policy. Ordinary citizens serve as neutral arbiters in contests among various experts 
and elites, representing a generic public interest. Yet clearly, ordinary people may also have 
distinctive interests of their own, which will not be well represented by any of these elites. In 
addition, then, it is also crucial to enable ordinary people to organize themselves to press their 
own priorities, forming groups which can recruit and employ such countervailing experts. The 
idea, in other words, is to create leverage points for popular mobilization: footholds in the 
policymaking process which encourage oppositional organizing outside the state. 
Leverage points for popular mobilization 
More specifically, my proposal is to structure rulemaking so that members of disadvantaged 
groups have opportunities to exert meaningful leverage, outside of the electoral cycle, on issues 
that are relevant to their interests. These formal entry points into the policy process could then 
serve as focal points for mobilization and organization in civil society, in turn enabling ordinary 
people to meaningfully counter the extra-procedural influence that well-resourced groups are 
routinely able to exercise with at least some measure of genuine political power. 
This proposal differs from many popular proposals for encouraging citizen participation, 
which are generally designed to gather information and work out compromises among equally 
situated interest groups, not to accommodate coordinated mobilization and popular pressure 
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from below.59 In practice, such participatory forums are often co-opted by powerful interests 
with the means and the incentive to coordinate and exert pressure.60 In order to meaningfully 
level the playing field, then, leverage points must be carefully designed to prevent this kind of 
co-optation. And again, an oppositional orientation is crucial: these forums should invite 
contestation while providing support for those groups with fewer resources. 
One way to accomplish this is to adapt existing proposals for institutionalizing oppositional 
expertise, like the idea of rewarding groups for successful challenges. This has been analogized 
to the “tripartism” between employers, unions, and the state, where the union represents a 
source of countervailing power that is supported by the legal framework. A more speculative 
possibility is raised by plebeian theorists of democracy, which entails excluding elites entirely 
from certain participatory forums, as with the institution of the tribunate in ancient Rome.61 
Both proposals are more promising than much of what passes for participatory democracy. 
Admittedly, however, both are still quite limited in their ability to overcome deep-seated 
asymmetries of power. On the one hand, administrative tripartism enables people without many 
resources to contest bureaucratic policy on a more equal footing, but is unlikely to generate 
widespread participation among those whose interests are at stake. On the other hand, plebeian 
institutions may generate mass mobilization and identification with popular leaders, but they 
provide little incentive for healthy epistemic practices or long-term organizing. Ordinary 
people participate, on this model, but only as an undifferentiated mass.  
In order to match the consistent pressure on agencies and other state actors that wealthy 
elites are routinely able to apply, ordinary people must somehow acquire a comparable capacity 
for coordinated and collective action, over sustained periods, in defense of specific goals. That 
requires organizing large numbers of people—the only concrete advantage ordinary people 
have over wealthy elites—within a structure that accommodates long-term strategic planning.62 
Of course, states have only a limited role to play in facilitating this kind of organizing, but the 
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priorities I have suggested—i.e., providing forums where organized groups can contest policy 
decisions, and actively supporting those with fewer resources—are an important start. 
As always, of course, many objections might still be leveled against each of these policy 
ideas, and it has not been my intention here to offer a comprehensive defense of any of them. 
Rather, the purpose of my discussion is simply to illustrate what it might mean to orient our 
action towards the goal of minimizing capture. In the context of designing procedural 
protections against capture in the administrative state, this means employing oppositional 
expertise and direct popular oversight within agencies—and indeed, these strategies reinforce 
one another. On the one hand, the adversarial institutions recommended by scholars of 
regulatory capture will be most effective at resisting capture if they engage popular 
participation in the ways I have suggested. On the other hand, popular participation will be 
most effective at resisting capture when it is employed in adversarial rather than collaborative 
contexts, and when it is specifically targeted at supporting countervailing power. Though these 
principles may be realized in a variety of different ways, both are necessary if the administrative 
state is to take seriously its mandate of fighting power with power. 
§VII. Conclusion: can we ever trust the administrative state? 
Contemporary critics of the administrative state sometimes suggest that the project of using 
centralized state power to provide public services and regulate the private sphere should largely 
be abandoned. Tracing the origins of this project to the frightening visions of social engineering 
articulated by elitist (and often racist) Progressive-era reformers, they condemn its track record 
as anti-democratic. Looking to the future, they warn of ever-increasing prerogative for 
unaccountable experts operating at ever-greater distance from the concerns of ordinary people. 
And though the picture they paint is often one-sided—neglecting more democratic visions of 
administration, as well as the important democratic goals many agencies have achieved—these 
critics point to very real dangers with centralized administrative governance. 
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This article has tried to acknowledge these dangers, while insisting that the solution cannot 
be to abandon the project of the administrative state altogether. On the one hand, I have argued, 
the public power of the state is not the only threatening kind of concentrated power. Private 
power can become dangerous as well—both in its own right, and because of its tendency to 
capture the state. If we eliminate the state’s capacity to contest the growth and concentration 
of private power, crucially, we actually increase the risk that it will eventually be captured by 
powerful private actors. Critics of the administrative state who seek to resolve its problems by 
getting rid of its major functions are simply refusing to grapple with this dilemma of public 
and private power, and the cure they propose is almost certainly worse than the disease. 
On the other hand, I have claimed, it is entirely possible to respond more productively to 
the real dangers of administrative governance, by making it more robust to capture. First, we 
can choose a general approach to state involvement across different policy areas that minimizes 
the risk of capture within each domain. As noted, this will not always entail decentralization or 
a withdrawal of the state, and in fact may sometimes require more active or intensive state 
involvement. Second, we can design substantive policies that minimize the discretion given to 
state actors while restricting private actors’ formal opportunities and independent capacity for 
capture, by employing principles of transparency, simplicity, and adversarialism. Third, we can 
procedurally insulate state action from capture by institutionalizing countervailing power and 
popular oversight at specific junctures that are especially prone to capture. 
Clearly, these sketches of an approach to reforming the administrative state fall far short of 
a comprehensive policy platform. As noted throughout, my aim in this article has not been to 
defend a particular normative theory, nor to prescribe a particular set of institutions. Appealing 
to broadly shared concerns about the danger of state capture, rather, I have sought to provide a 
set of mid-level heuristics for designing administrative institutions. By design, these heuristics 
are open to a range of interpretations, meaning that those with different foundational 
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assumptions and substantive intuitions will inevitably come to different conclusions about the 
particular policy program they entail. At the same time, the framework that emerges is not 
infinitely flexible. Of this much, at least, we can be certain: abandoning the project of the 
administrative state is a dead end. Instead, we can and must learn how to transform it into a 
reliable weapon against concentrated private power. 
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